The Apostasy Penalty: Evidence and Debate

Few subjects frighten a doubting Muslim more than the apostasy penalty, and few are discussed online with less care. This guide sets out the evidence the classical jurists relied on, the positions they took, and the modern debate among Muslim scholars, as neutrally as it can. It quotes the sources and names who said what. It does not advocate a position, and it is not a ruling about anyone. If you are reading this because you are afraid for yourself, please read the last section first.

The evidence in the hadith

The Qur’an warns of loss in the Hereafter for those who turn back from faith (2:217; 16:106) but prescribes no worldly penalty for apostasy. The classical penalty rests on hadith. Three reports carry most of the weight.

“Whoever changes his religion, kill him.” Al-Bukhari reports through ‘Ikrima that ‘Ali burned some people described as zanadiqa, heretics. Ibn ‘Abbas, hearing of it, said that he would not have burned them, because the Prophet forbade punishing with fire, but that he would have killed them, because the Prophet said: “whoever changes his religion, kill him”.¹ The report appears twice in al-Bukhari, nos. 3017 and 6922.

“Except in one of three cases.” Al-Bukhari and Muslim report from ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas’ud that the blood of a Muslim who testifies to God’s oneness and the Prophet’s message is not lawful except in one of three cases: a life for a life, the married adulterer, and, in al-Bukhari’s wording, “the one who leaves the religion, abandoning the community”.² Muslim’s wording is “the one who abandons his religion, separating from the community”.

The narration of ‘A’isha. Abu Dawud reports the same saying through ‘A’isha with a different third case: “a man who goes out to fight God and His Messenger; he is killed, or crucified, or exiled from the land”. Al-Albani graded it sahih.³ This wording matters in the modern debate, as we will see.

Alongside these, the jurists cited the report in al-Bukhari in which Mu’adh ibn Jabal, arriving in Yemen, found a man bound in Abu Musa’s presence, a Jew who had accepted Islam and then returned to Judaism, and refused to sit until he was killed, saying it was the judgement of God and His Messenger.⁴ And they knew the report, also in al-Bukhari, of a Bedouin who pledged allegiance to the Prophet in Medina, fell ill, asked three times to be released from his pledge, was refused, and left the city. The Prophet said that Medina is like a bellows that expels its impurity; the report mentions no pursuit or punishment.⁵ Scholars disagree about what that report shows.

The classical positions

Ibn Qudama, the Hanbali jurist, summarises the classical law in al-Mughni. He states that the scholars agreed on the obligation to kill the apostate, reporting it from Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, ‘Ali, Mu’adh, Abu Musa, Ibn ‘Abbas, Khalid and others, and calls it a consensus.⁶ That statement represents the dominant classical position in all four Sunni schools. A reader should know that it is the position the classical texts state, and this guide does not soften it.

Within that position there was real disagreement on details, and the details are not small.

Women. The Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi’i schools applied the penalty to men and women alike. Abu Hanifa held that a woman apostate is not killed, though she is compelled to return by imprisonment and beating, citing the Prophet’s prohibition on killing women, and reasoning that since a woman is not killed for original disbelief she is not killed for disbelief that comes later.⁶

The invitation to return. Most jurists required that the apostate be invited to repent, istitaba, before any penalty. Ibn Qudama reports a three-day period from ‘Umar, held by Malik, Ishaq and the Hanafis, and one of al-Shafi’i’s two views. He also records the opposite view, that no invitation is required, from ‘Ubayd ibn ‘Umayr and Tawus, and reported from al-Hasan.⁷ He narrates the report in which ‘Umar, told that an apostate had been executed at once, asked why they had not held him for three days, fed him a loaf each day and invited him to repent, “perhaps he would repent”.⁷

Al-Nakha’i. Ibrahim al-Nakha’i, the early Kufan jurist, is reported to have held that the apostate is invited to repent indefinitely. Ibn Qudama notes that this leads to his never being killed, and rejects it as contrary to the Sunnah and the consensus.⁸ The report of al-Nakha’i’s view is often cited in the modern debate. Ibn Qudama’s rejection of it should be cited with it.

Due process. The classical law reserved the matter to the ruler and his courts. Ibn Qudama states that if anyone other than the ruler kills an apostate, he has done wrong and is to be punished.⁹ The classical law did not license private killing, and anyone who claims otherwise is departing from it.

How the classical jurists understood the ruling

Classical works offered more than one rationale. Some framed apostasy as a crime against God’s right. The Hanafi argument about women, set out above, draws an analogy with the women of an enemy people, who were not killed in war, and so links the penalty to the law of war rather than to belief alone. The structure of the riddah wars under Abu Bakr, fought against tribes withdrawing allegiance from the Medinan polity, gave the ruling a strongly political setting. This site’s rebuttal apostasy and the classical law notes Muhammad Hamidullah’s view that it treated apostasy as politico-religious rebellion, and the companion site’s article on the political history of apostasy follows that history.

The modern scholarly debate

In the modern period, Muslim scholars have argued openly about whether the classical penalty applies to a person who changes belief privately in a modern state. The positions fall roughly into three groups. The summaries below are short and the works should be read in full; the page references are listed as needing the owner’s check.

Retaining the penalty, with distinctions. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in Jarimat al-Ridda wa ‘Uqubat al-Murtadd (1996), upheld the penalty in principle, but distinguished between an apostate who keeps his change of belief to himself and one who campaigns against Islam and its community, and argued that the gravest treatment concerns the second.

Limiting it to treason or rebellion. A number of scholars read the hadith in light of ‘A’isha’s narration, in which the third case is a man who goes out to fight God and His Messenger, and the phrase in Ibn Mas’ud’s narration, “abandoning the community”. On this reading the ruling concerned apostasy joined to armed rebellion or treason against the polity, and left private belief outside it. Mahmud Shaltut, Shaykh al-Azhar, argued in al-Islam ‘Aqida wa Shari’a that a fixed penalty is not established by solitary reports and that disbelief in itself does not warrant killing; the ruling attaches to aggression against Muslims. Mohammad Hashim Kamali makes a related argument in Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997).

Rejecting a worldly penalty for belief. Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, in Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (2004), and Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, in Apostasy in Islam: A Historical and Scriptural Analysis (2011), argue that the Qur’an’s affirmation of freedom of belief (2:256; 18:29; 10:99) governs the hadith, that the Prophet’s own practice, including the Bedouin who left Medina, shows no penalty for change of belief alone, and that the classical ruling belongs to the confessional politics of its time.

Each group answers the others. Those who retain the penalty point to the claimed consensus and the general wording “whoever changes his religion”. Those who limit or reject it point to the specific wording of the other narrations, the Qur’an’s verses on choice, and the political setting. Both sides are Muslim scholars arguing from the same sources. Anyone who tells you that the argument is settled, in either direction, is reporting a preference.

What applies in practice

A reader’s real question is usually “what can happen to me”. The answer depends on where you live. Most Muslim-majority states attach no criminal penalty to leaving Islam. A small number retain it in statute or in uncodified judicial practice, and several attach civil consequences to marriage, inheritance or identity documents. Our guide leaving and the law sets out the statutes by region. International human rights law protects the freedom to change one’s religion: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 18, as the UN Human Rights Committee explained in its General Comment No. 22. The companion site discusses this in apostasy and international law.

Reading the hadith fairly

It is tempting, on both sides, to read only the report that suits you. The person who wants to frighten quotes “whoever changes his religion, kill him” and stops. The person who wants to reassure quotes 2:256 and stops. A fair reader holds all of them together: the general wording, the narrations that speak of abandoning the community and of armed rebellion, the report of the Bedouin who left, the claimed consensus and the dissent reported from al-Nakha’i, and the Qur’an’s verses on choice. Our guide hadith grading explained explains how the scholars weigh reports, and the doubt the hadith about leaving answers the most common form of the question.

For the reader this is about

Doubting is an offence nowhere. Having questions is not apostasy in any school of law, and no legal provision in any country reaches a person who is unsure. Even the classical law as stated above required an adult of sound mind, acting freely, and a court, and condemned private violence.

But the danger some people face is real, and it more often comes from family or community pressure than from any court. If you are frightened, read afraid of what happens if I leave and what leaving actually costs, and look at where to find support. If you are in immediate danger, contact your local emergency number. Do not make decisions about disclosure while you are unsafe; your safety comes first.

Sources

1. Sahih al-Bukhari 6922 (also 3017), 'Ikrima from Ibn 'Abbas: 'whoever changes his religion, kill him'. https://shamela.ws/book/1681/10338
2. Sahih al-Bukhari 6878 and Sahih Muslim 1676, Ibn Mas'ud: the three cases. https://shamela.ws/book/1681/10267
3. Sunan Abi Dawud 4353, 'A'isha: 'a man who goes out to fight God and His Messenger'. Al-Albani: sahih. https://shamela.ws/book/1726/5996
4. Sahih al-Bukhari 6923, Abu Musa: Mu'adh and the man who returned to Judaism. https://shamela.ws/book/1681/10339
5. Sahih al-Bukhari 7211, Jabir: the Bedouin who asked to be released from his pledge and left Medina. https://shamela.ws/book/1681/10756
6. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni (Maktabat al-Qahira ed.), Kitab al-Murtadd: the claimed consensus; the Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi'i position on women and Abu Hanifa's dissent. https://shamela.ws/book/8463/3917
7. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni (Maktabat al-Qahira ed.), Kitab al-Murtadd: the three-day invitation to repent; the contrary view of 'Ubayd ibn 'Umayr and Tawus; 'Umar's 'perhaps he would repent'. https://shamela.ws/book/8463/3919
8. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni (Maktabat al-Qahira ed.), Kitab al-Murtadd: al-Nakha'i, 'invited to repent indefinitely', and Ibn Qudama's rejection of it. https://shamela.ws/book/8463/3920
9. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni (Maktabat al-Qahira ed.), Kitab al-Murtadd: killing by anyone other than the ruler is wrong and punishable. https://shamela.ws/book/8463/3923
10. Sahih Muslim 1676 (Ibn Mas'ud), Muslim's wording. https://shamela.ws/book/1727/4317
11. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Jarimat al-Ridda wa 'Uqubat al-Murtadd fi Daw' al-Qur'an wa al-Sunna (Maktabat Wahba, Cairo, 1996).
12. Mahmud Shaltut, al-Islam 'Aqida wa Shari'a (Dar al-Shuruq).
13. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Islamic Texts Society, 1997).
14. Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Ashgate, 2004).
15. Taha Jabir al-'Alwani, Apostasy in Islam: A Historical and Scriptural Analysis (IIIT, 2011).
16. UDHR art. 18; ICCPR art. 18; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (1993).